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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Granting of Tax Exemptions by States for Religious Properties Used for Devotional
Purposes Does Not Violate the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In June, 1967, Frederick Walz bought a small tract of land on
Staten Island.' Almost immediately he brought suit in the New York
Supreme Court to enjoin the New York City Tax Commission from
granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for property used exclusively for religious worship.2 His main contention was
that the exemption, authorized by state constitutional and statutory
provisions, indirectly required him to make a contribution to religious
bodies and thereby violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' In concrete terms, the
$5.24 annual real estate tax Walz had to pay on his lot was allegedly
inflated illegally to compensate for the revenues lost to the state as a
result of church tax exemptions.
Summary judgment was granted to the defendant Tax Commission and unanimously affirmed (5-0) by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, with no written opinion being given. 4 The
plaintiff's contentions were again rejected in another unanimous decision by the New York Court of Appeals, which stated in a per curiam
opinion:
Firmly embedded in the law of the state, both by Constitution . . . and by statute [citations omitted], is the doctrine that
real property owned by a religious corporation and used exclusively for religious purposes is exempt from taxation [citations omitted], and research discloses-and the 21/-page brief
of the plaintiff-appellant herein cites no authority to the contrary-that courts throughout the country have long and consistently held that the exemption of such real property from
taxation does not violate the Constitution of the United States.
[Citations omitted.] We see no reason for departing from this
conclusion in this case. 5

1. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
2. Id. at 35; Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 666
(1970); Appendix to Briefs at 1, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
3. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 667.
4. Walz v. Tax Commission, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1968).
5. Walz v. Tax Commission, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 518 (1969).
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Mr. Walz appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted
probable jurisdiction, 6 and affirmed by a seven-to-one margin the
prior decision of the New York Court of Appeals. 7
THEORIES INVOLVED-DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLES

From a historical standpoint, the New York Court of Appeals was
undoubtedly accurate in saying that the principle of property tax exemptions for churches was firmly embedded in American tradition.
Over two-thirds of the state constitutions provide for exemptions of
church property from taxation, about half of these making the exemption mandatory. 8 Whether mandatory or not, all 50 states and the
federal government now grant tax exemptions by legislative enactment
to property used for religious worship.9 From pre-Revolutionary days
the states have granted such exemptions to churches,' 0 but only on
rare occasions have they been challenged in the courts. When challenged, the courts, both state and federal, have invariably upheld the
validity of the exemption." In almost all of these cases the exemptions were questioned on grounds other than the First Amendment,
but even in the two cases before 1947 which did use violation of the
First Amendment as grounds for appeal, the state courts in each case
2
rejected this contention.'
Prior to 1947 there was virtually no support for the contention of
the plaintiff that the granting of tax exemptions to churches violated
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In that year,
however, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Everson v. Board of Education," which marked the starting point of
6.

Walz v. Tax Commission, 395 U.S. 957 (1969).

7. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Walz].
8. A. VanAlstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 Ohio St., L.J. 461
note 5 (1959); Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 Columbia Law Review 968, 991 note 147; 6 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1970).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501 et seq. 26 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.; P. Kauper, The
Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities, in The Wall Between
Church and State, 95 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); L. Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom, at
211 (1967); A. VanAlstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, supra note 8; Note,
Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 968, 969-70
(1949). See also Walz, supra note 7, at 676.
10. See Walz, supra, note 7, at 683-85 (Brennan, J., concurring); H. Brown and
J. Mahon, Jr., Church and State-Taxation of Religious Organizations-Benefits
Granted by Federal and State Governments, Vill. L. Rev. 255 (1959-60); L. Pfeffer,
supra note 9, at 210-11.
11. Walz, supra note 7, at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring); A. VanAlstyne, supra
note 8.
12. Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst St. Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 168 N.E. 1 (1928);
Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275 (1877).
13. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

1971

Case Comments

modem analysis and application of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. Since many legal commentators began to reassess the
entrenched position of religious tax exemptions in light of the Everson
decision,' 4 and since Walz based his attack squarely on the "new
look" of the Establishment Clause to overturn 200 years of tradition,
it is important to examine Everson and the line of cases following it in
detail.
In Everson v. Board of Education'5 the plaintiff challenged the
right of a local New Jersey school board, under the authorization of a
New Jersey statute, to reimburse the parents of parochial school children for bus fares to and from school. Among other things, the plaintiff claimed that the board's resolution and the New Jersey statute
forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain Catholic
schools, thereby using state power to support church schools. This, it
was argued, was contrary to the First Amendment's prohibition respecting the establishment of religion.1 6 By a five-to-four margin, the
Supreme Court held that the statute and resolution in question were
not in violation of the Establishment Clause.
In the Opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Black differentiated between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause," and
attempted to lay down certain guidelines for applying the former.
That he was not totally successful in clarifying the principle involved
is borne out by the fact that both sides in the Walz appeal relied on
Everson to support their argument.' 8
The confusion centers around the question of whether one places
heavier emphasis on the first part of the Everson Court's discussion of
the Establishment Clause or the latter part. The opinion first attempts
to establish certain general principles regarding government aid to religion:
14. See e.g., P. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution, at 13 (1962); L.
Pfeffer, supra, note 9 at 217-18 and pertinent references therein (1967); H. Brown and
J. Mahon, Jr., Church and State-Taxation of Religious Organizations-Benefits
Granted by Federal and State Governmentns, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 255 (1959-60); M.
Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 Law
and Contemporary Problems, 144, 146-47 (1949); Note, Constitutionality of Tax
Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 968, 968-69 (1949).
15. Supra, note 13.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id. at 8, 14 passim.
The First Amendment clause pertinent here reads: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
U.S. Const., Amend. I.
18. Brief for Appellant at 6-8; Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, 3; Brief for Appellee at 18; See also briefs of amici curiae, id.; Walz, supra, note 7.
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The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. .

.

. No person can be punished for entertaining or

professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions ...
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and State."
Read by itself, this quote from the Opinion appears to be a dogmatic
pronouncement forbidding state aid of any kind to any religion. However, in further clarifying and applying this "no-aid" principle, Justice
Black stated:
On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude
individual Catholics, Lutherans . . . or the members of any
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
20

the benefits of public welfare legislation.
Admitting that some aid is indirectly given to religion by providing
free bus transportation to religious-affiliated schools, Everson compares such aid with police and fire protection and other public services
provided for church-affiliated schools. All of these aid religion indirectly because without them, such institutions would find it harder, if
not impossible, to operate. To literally follow the principle of separation of church and state to its logical extreme, the state would have to
eliminate even these services to religious institutions.
But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.
That Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to
be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
21
them.
The Court appeared to hold that while the Establishment Clause prohibits aid to any religion for any purpose, this clause could not be used
as an instrument of hostility towards religion by denying religious institutions general welfare benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled.
19.
20.
21.

Everson, supra, note 13, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
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The dissents in Everson immediately saw the problems involved.
Mr. Justice Jackson commented:
[T]he undertones of the Opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly
discordant with its conclusion22 yielding support to their commingling in educational matters.
However, it was Mr. Justice Rutledge who sounded the haunting keynote to the problem that the Everson decision created:
If it is part of the state's function to supply to religious schools
or their patrons the smaller items of educational expense, because the legislature may say they perform a public function, it
is hard to see why the larger ones may also not be paid .... 23
The process of defining more clearly the broad boundaries set down
in the Everson decision has continued to this day. Those favoring absolute separation of church and state put dogmatic emphasis on the
first premise and general principle of Everson ;24 those advocating a
more benign relationship look to the second premise and actual decision in Everson.25 One year later, Mr. Justice Frankfurter described
the situation in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education.26
Speaking on behalf of the four original dissenters in Everson, his concurring opinion stated:
[T]he mere formulation of a relevant Constitutional principle
is the beginning of the solution of a problem, not its answer.
This is so because the meaning of a spacious conception like
that of the separation of Church from State is unfolded as
appeal is made to the principle from case to case. We are all
agreed that the First and the Fourteenth Amendments have a
secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 'established church.' But agreement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was designed
to erect a 'wall of separation between Church and State,' does
not preclude a clash of views as to what the wall separates. 27
In the McCollum case, those who had despaired of maintaining the
wall as a result of Everson gained new hope. Four members of the
Everson majority28 joined the four dissenters2 9 in rejecting as uncon22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 50 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., L. Pfeffer, supra, note 9, at 149-50.
25. See, e.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 at 249
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting); Walz, supra, note 7, at 670; Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, at 242 (1968).
26. McCollum, id.
27. Id. at 212-13.
28. Black, Vinson, Douglas and Murphy, JJ.
29. Rutledge, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Burton, JJ. Rutledge and Burton also
joined in the majority opinion in McCollum.
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stitutional a released-time plan whereby church representatives were
allowed to come into the public schools once a week to give religious
instructions to the pupils. Mr. Justice Black, again writing for the
Court, repeated his "no-aid" principle ° from Everson and concluded:
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school
buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The
State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that
it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through
school machinery. This
use of the State's compulsory public
31
is not separation of Church and State.
Mr. Justice Reed, the lone dissenter, objected:
I find it difficult to extract from the opinion any conclusion
as to what it is in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional. . . . None of the reversing opinions say whether the
purpose of the Champaign plan for religious instruction during
school hours is unconstitutional or whether it is some ingredient used in or omitted from the formula that makes the plan
unconstitutional .32
Four years later the Court, taking a different approach, upheld (6-3)
in Zorach v. Clauson3 3" a released-time plan similar to that in McCollum. The obvious difference, which saved the New York program in
Zorach, was the fact that in the latter the religious instruction was not
conducted on public school property. 34 While pointing out that the
Court still followed McCollum,3 5 the majority paid greater heed to the
aspect of cooperation between church and state in protecting the students' right to the free exercise of their religion. The Court, in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, reasoned that a teacher in allowing a student to be dismissed for a holy day service "aids" religion
to some extent, but not sufficiently to violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. The released-time program in Zorach was
viewed as merely a logical extension of such permission.3 6 "Accommodation" was injected as a new guide-word alongside "neutrality" for
37
determining cases involving the religion clause.
When the state . . . cooperates with religious authorities
. it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects
the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

McCollum, supra, note 13, at 209.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 240.
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 308, 315.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 313.
See, e.g., id. at 314-15.
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service to their spiritual needs .... [W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to
be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts
to widen the effective scope of religious influence. 8

Justice Black, now dissenting, argued with strong justification that the
decision contradicted the stand taken four years earlier.
McCollum . . . upheld that Illinois could not constitutionally
manipulate the compelled classroom hours of its compulsory
school machinery so as to channel children into sectarian
classes. Yet that is exactly what the Court holds New York
39

can do.
Whether or not Zorach was in line with McCollum,4" the fact remained that Zorach certainly was not in line with what Black conceived
to be the majority position in McCollum.
By emphasizing the Free Exercise Clause and the "hostility" aspect
in Zorach, the Court tempered the pervasiveness of the Establishment
Clause, but the most important statement in Zorach may well have
been Justice Douglas' simple justification: "The problem, like many
problems in constitutional law, is one of degree."'"
Prayers (Engel v. Vitale42 ) and Bible reading (Abington School
District v. Schempp43 ) in public schools provided the Court with further opportunities to interpret the religion clauses.44 Professor Kurland was reasonably justified in commenting, on the heels of the two
decisions:
38. Id. at 313-14.
39. Id. at 316. See also P. Kauper, supra, note 14, at 15; L. Pfeffer, supra
note 9, at 175; 18 DePaul L. Rev. 785, 794 (1969).
40. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 261 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
41. Zorach v. Clauson, supra, note 33, at 314. See also P. Kauper, supra note
14, at 19.
42. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
43. Supra note 40, decided with Murray v. Curlett.
44. Prior to this the Supreme Court had considered five other cases relating to
the Establishment Clause.
In four related cases upholding the constitutionality of
Sunday closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961), the Court
pointed out that the Establishment Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions. (McGowan, at 442). This idea is further developed
in Schempp, supra, note 40. Cf. McGowan at 441 and at 466 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in latter) with Schempp at 222. In another case, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961), the Court, in striking down a Maryland statute requiring belief in
God as a requisite for holding public office, reiterated that neither the federal nor
state governments can pass laws aiding believers in religion as opposed to non-believers (at 495). This point had previously been expressed in dicta in Everson, supra
note 13, at 15-16, McCollum, supra, note 25, at 210-11, and Zorach, supra note 33, at
314.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 2: 161

This, and only this, is certainly to be derived from the Engel
and Schempp cases. The states may not prescribe
the con45
duct of religious ceremonies in their public schools.
By themselves, the decisions add only confusion to the interpretation
47
of the religion clauses,"6 but in conjunction with Sherbert v. Verner,
decided the same day as Schempp, and Board of Education v. Allen,48
five years later, Schempp takes on greater meaning.
Examining the interrelationship between the Establishment Clause
and Free Exercise Clause, Mr. Justice Clark emphasized in Schempp
the need for a "wholesome neutrality" on the part of government in
safeguarding both clauses. 49 To determine whether legislative enactments violate this neutrality with regard to the Establishment Clause,
Justice Clark proposed a test:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 50
It has been noted5 1 that Justice Clark, in emphasizing the neutrality aspect, carefully avoided any reference to government accommodation to religion, although three of the concurring justices gave specific
approval to the concept.52 Here consideration of Sherbert v. Verner5" is relevant. In that case the Court held that South Carolina
could not withhold unemployment compensation payments to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturdays. The opinion
said, in effect, that a state not only may, but must accommodate itself
to the church in certain situations in order to safeguard the Free Exercise of Religion. Although the case revolves around the Free Exercise Clause, the interrelationship between the two religion clauses is evident.
45. P. Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, The Wall Between Church and State,
at 178 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
46. See also P. Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation in Religion and the Public Order, at 26-27, 38 (D. Giannella ed. 1963).
47. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
48. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
49. Supra, note 40, at 222.
50. id.
51. P. Kauper, supra note 46, at 18.
52. See Schempp, supra note 40, at 294 et seq. (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
305-08 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
53. Supra, note 47.
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This holding, [says Justice Brennan for the Court], but reaffirms
a principle that we announced [in Everson] . . . that no State
may exclude individual Catholics, ... because of their faith, or
54
lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
If Schempp emphasized neutrality in church-state relations, Zorach
and Sherbert reiterated the view that the "wholesome" aspect of the
neutrality criterion must not be overlooked, and that neutrality under
the Establishment Clause has its limitations.
Strict separationists hailed the Engel and Schempp decisions as
shoring up the wall of separation between church and state, but Board
of Education v. Allen 55 indicated that their victory might have been pyrrhic. Holding that loans of non-religious textbooks by public school authorities to sectarian schools does not violate the Establishment or Free
Exercise Clause, Allen adopted Justice Clark's test in Schempp. Recognizing that this test, standing alone, could be given either a strict or
a liberal interpretation, Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court,
noted that the Schempp opinion relied on Everson, and concluded that
a strict separationist interpretation of the test could not be reconciled
with the result of that case.5 6 If the New Jersey bus statute in Everson was considered secular in purpose and primary effect, so must the
New York book statute in Allen be considered. In reaching its conclusion, the Court adopted another factor in considering legislative acts
of a religous nature:
We are unable to hold . . . that this statute results in uncon57

stitutional involvement of the State with religious instruction.
[Emphasis added.]
Therefore, twenty-one years after Everson, the Supreme Court resolved the clash between the two premises 58 primarily in favor of the
latter. Government must be neutral in its dealings with religion, but
not hostile. Avoiding hostility means that it may accommodate itself
toward religion even if religious liberty and the Free Exercise Clause
are not threatened, so long as neither the purpose nor the primary effect of a legislative act is the advancement or inhibition of religion.
But this rule, in turn, requires its own yardstick for determining limitations. Allen provides that measure with the new criterion of "in54. Id. at 410.
55. Supra, note 48, at 236.
56. Id. at 243.
57. Id. at 248. Justices Brennan and Goldberg had first introduced the concept
of "involvement" in their concurring opinions in Schempp. See supra, note 40, at
294-304 (Brennan, J., concurring), id. at 306-07 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
58. See Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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volvement." And not to be overlooked in this evolution of standards
is the quotation by the Allen majority from Zorach: "The problem
. . . is one of degree." 59

Walz
On three previous occasions, one as recently as 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court had denied hearings for challenges to tax exemptions for
churches. 0° The New York Times, commenting on the U.S. Supreme
Court's agreement to hear the Walz appeal, declared that the case
"could produce the most far-reaching church-state decision in the
court's history."'" This fact would have been eminently true had the
Supreme Court reversed the New York courts. As actually decided,
the case merely preserved the status quo of a centuries-old tradition.
Nevertheless, the result in Walz constitutes an approval of the allowance of governmental benefits to religion greater than had been expressly authorized by the Court since the era prior to Everson.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger's Opinion of the Court is essentially a recapitulation and reassessment of what the Court has said on the matter
of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses since Everson. Admitting that some of the Court's opinions suffer from "considerable
internal inconsistency" which results from "what, in retrospect, may
have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses, ' 62 he
attempts to extract the simple core of principles to be drawn from this
series of decisions. In so doing, however, he takes a step forward by
firmly establishing the direction of the present Court on church-state
matters.
Subtly important in the opinion is the absence of any reference to
Jefferson's famous "wall of separation between church and state."
This controversial metaphor 63 was resurrected by Justice Black, speaking for the Court, as part of the first premise in the Everson decision, 64
repeated in McCollum, 65 and used again by Justice Black as late as
THE DECISION IN

59. Allen, supra note 48, at 242.
60. Murray v. Comptroller of Md. Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966);
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); General Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73
(1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46
Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Heisey v. County of Ala-

meda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
61. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
62. Supra, note 7, at 668.
63. As one author commented, "Certainly there is something anomalous about a
wall that will admit a school bus without the 'slightest breach,' but is impermeable
to a prayer." D. Oaks ed., The Wall Between Church and State, at 2-3 (1963).
64. Supra, note 13, at 16.
65. Supra, note 25, at 211, 212.
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1961, in Torcaso v. Watkins.6 It was never used thereafter in any
majority opinion, although Justice Black once again relied on it in his
dissent in Allen.17 In the Walz opinion, the Court refers instead to
the "not so narrow a channel" of neutrality described by Mr. Justice
Harlan in his Sherbert dissent. 68 Contained in this otherwise small
change of metaphors is the basic shift in, or perhaps refinement of, the
Supreme Court's position on the First Amendment religion clauses
from Everson to Walz.
The first hint of the Court's position comes at the very beginning of
the Walz opinion when the Chief Justice says that for the men who
wrote the First Amendment, "establishment" of a religion connoted
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign ..

."69

(Emphasis added.)

Chief Justice Burger develops

the point further when he quotes from Zorach that the First Amendment "does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State."7
He firmly establishes the position of
the Court with the observation, "No perfect or absolute separation is
really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one which seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive
entanglement.""
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all
that has been said by the Court, the opinion states, is "that we will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion."7 2 These broad boundaries form the outside
extremities of the "channel." Between the Scylla and Charybdis of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, the Court must "chart a
course"73 of neutrality which "cannot be an absolutely straight line."'7 4
The path to follow must be broad enough so that there will be "room
for play in the joints. '7 5 Far from constructing a wall between
church and state, the opinion calls for an overlapping area in which
church and state need not be uncompromisingly separated at all. 76
The purpose of such a flexible arrangement is to produce, "a benevo66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

367 U.S. 488, 492 (1961).
Supra, note 48, at 251.
Supra, note 7, at 669.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 670.
id. at 669.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 669-70.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 2: 161

lent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
' 77
sponsorship and without interference.
The rule enunciated by the Walz Court for determining in each case
whether a particular act goes beyond the area of permissible "benevolent neutrality" is the Schempp test as interpreted in Allen.78 Each
case must turn on whether the particular acts in question are:
1. Intended to
a. establish or
b. interfere with religious beliefs and practices or
2. Have the primary effect of doing so.
Applying the Schempp test to the facts in Walz, the Supreme Court
found that the legislative intention of tax exemptions is neither the advancement nor inhibition of religion. Quite the contrary, states have
passed tax exemption laws so that churches and other non-profit organizations will not be inhibited in their activities by property taxes or
the hazard of loss of property for nonpayment of taxes.79 The New
York statute does not establish a religion, but spares the free exercise
80
of religion from the burden of taxation.
As for the effect, the second part of the test, the Court declares that
the end result must not be an excessive governmental entanglement
with religion. 81 Once again the test is "inescapably one of degree. 8 2
The Court notes that either course, taxation of churches or exemption,
occasions some degree of involvement with religion, but concludes that
the exemption of churches from taxation actually creates a lesser degree of involvement than would a program of taxation.83 Although
tax exemptions granted by the state do admittedly result in an indirect
economic benefit to churches,8 4 the benefit and the resulting involvement is minimal and, says the Court, "tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other."8' 5 By
granting tax exemptions to churches, the Court observes, government
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.8 6
77. Id. at 669. The term "benevolent neutrality" is not original with the Walz
decision. Professor Paul Kauper used the term in a 1963 essay discussing the
Schempp and Sherbert decisions to describe the same position as that taken here by the
Walz court. P. Kauper, supra, note 46, at 16 et seq.

78.
79.

Walz, id. at 669, 672.
Id. at 672.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 673.
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DOUGLAS' DISSENT IN Walz

Mr. Justice Douglas was a member of the Court that decided Everson 7 in 1947, and originally found himself allied with the majority
of the Court. However, in his concurring opinion in Engel v. Vitale"8
he adopted a stand that even the slightest cooperation between church
and state constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Concurring in Schempp, Justice Douglas said,
Through the mechanism of the State, all of the people are
being required to finance a religious exercise that only some
of the people want and that violates the sensibilities of others.8 9
In light of this statement, it should come as no surprise that Justice
Douglas objected to the church tax exemptions in Waltz. 90 The very
contention of the petitioner was that the state was forcing him to
finance a religious exercise that violated his beliefs.
As Justice Douglas views the case, the question is whether believers
organized in church groups can be made exempt from real estate taxes
merely because they are believers, while nonbelievers, whether organized or not, must pay them.9
The first premise in Douglas' analysis is the questionable one that
the believers themselves are being exempted. As the Walz case is presented, at least, it is not the believers themselves but the religious organization as a separate entity that is being exempted. The believers
per se reap no direct financial benefit from the tax exemption; quite
the contrary, because of the exemption, their own property taxes rise in
the same proportion as do those of the petitioner.
A second, and related, possible weakness in the Douglas argument
is his tacit assumption that nonbelievers are unfairly treated because
antitheological, atheistic, or agnostic groups would not receive the
same tax exemption as churches.9" Although Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion assumes that such groups would be equally as exempt from property taxes, 9" Justice Douglas is not so convinced.
However, at least two prior cases on the federal and state appellate
87. Supra, note 13.
88. Supra, note 42,
89. Supra, note 40,
90. It goes without
tax-purported textbooks
supra, note 48, at 255.

at 437.
at 229.
saying that Justice Douglas protested vigorously the lending of
to parochial school children. See Board of Education v. Allen,

91.

Walz, supra note 7, at 700.

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 697.

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 2: 161

94
levels have extended religious tax exemptions to cover similar groups.
No United States Supreme Court case has specifically ruled in favor of
a broad extension of such tax exemptions, but by the same token, no
case has ruled against it. What case law there is, however, seems to
favor an extension. 95 In light of these facts, the assumption of Mr.
Justice Douglas that nonbelieving groups would automatically be discriminated against is questionable. Emphasizing issues which have not
been presented to the Court or even shown to exist, he attempts, in effect, to destroy the whole on the conjecture that a part is unresolved.

Much of the dissent relies heavily on the arguments of James Madison in advocating complete separation of church and state."6 Both
Madison and Jefferson have been repeatedly cited to buttress "separation" arguments,9 7 but this reliance on their views appears overemphasized. Jefferson was out of the country during the entire period
when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were being deliberated and
passed.9 8 Although his previously expressed opinions carried much
weight in the adoption of the religion clauses, he could hardly be considered the sole influence in their formulation.99 Madison has justifiably been called the leading architect of the religion clauses,1 °° but
again it should not be assumed that every utterance he made in his
lifetime concerning the religion clauses should be automatically accepted as irrefutable authority. As Justice Brennan points out in his
concurring opinion in Walz, there is strong indirect evidence that Madison, although vehemently opposed to other forms of state aid to religion, was not necessarily opposed to tax exemptions to churches.' 1
Madison was a member of the Virginia legislature when that body
voted exemptions for churches, and no record can be found of any
opposition by him. It is true that in his later years he did oppose such
exemptions, but again, as Mr. Justice Brennan points out, this may
well have been merely an extreme view which Madison reached late in
94. Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 371,
249 F.2d 127 (1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394
(Cal. App., 1957).
95. Id.
96. Walz, supra at 704 passim.
97. See, e.g., Everson, supra note 13, at 11-12; also 28-29, 32-46, 63-74 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting); McCollum, supra note 25, at 214 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Engel,
supra note 42, at 428; McGowan, supra note 44, at 577-78 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Allen, supra note 48, at 266 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. D. Malone, Jefferson, Thomas, 16 Encyclopedia Americana 3 (1966).
99. See, e.g., McCollum, supra note 25, at 245-48 (Reed, J., dissenting); also J.

Story, 2 Commentaries on the Connstitution, 629-34 (5th ed. 1891).
100.
101.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
Supra note 7, at 684-85.
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life. It certainly does not seem to have been a common view held by
the other Founding Fathers. °2 As further evidence that Madison
cannot be cited unquestioningly on the religion clauses, one need only
look to his action as President, when he vetoed a bill incorporating the
Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria, Virginia, because he believed it to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. Today, with
incorporation of religious organizations an accepted fact throughout
the nation, it is doubtful that any court would follow Madison's precedent by declaring such an incorporating act a violation of the First
Amendment.' 0 3
Mr. Justice Douglas also classifies a tax exemption as tantamount to
a state subsidy without any further qualification.'
That a tax exemption is aid of a sort to a religious body is not denied by the majority, but they and the concurring justices agree that there are important
differences between an exemption and a direct subsidy.' 0 5 Tax exemptions by themselves add nothing to the churches' coffers; they become beneficial only when and if a church obtains something of value
from another source. At best, they leave a religious organization free
to originate and flourish or wither according to the support of its followers without being burdened by property taxes. Justice Douglas
himself expressed something of this in Zorach when he said,
We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that . . .
lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the
appeal of its dogma. 106
As the majority points out, the government does not transfer any revenues to churches, but simply abstains from demanding that the church
1
give revenues to the state.

7

In response to the appellee's argument based upon the long tradition of church tax exemptions, Justice Douglas gives a rather unconvincing recital of the Fourteenth Amendment and its only recent application to the First Amendment religion clauses. 1 8 Even granting
that the First Amendment has only in recent years been extended to
cover the states, still no strong case is presented for overturning the
long-established tradition of tax exemptions. As early as 1886 Gib102. See J. Story, supra note 99.
103. See generally 76 C.J.S. Religious Societies §§ 4-10; note also McGowan,
supra, note 44. at 437-41.
104. Walz, supra note 7, at 701, 704 passim.
105. Id. at 675; 690 (Brennan, J., concurring); 698 (Harlan, J., concurring).
106. Zorach, supra note 33, at 313.
107. Walz, supra, note 7, at 675.
108. Id. at 701-03.
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bons v. District of Columbia'0 9 was decided in a federal jurisdiction where the First Amendment was directly applicable without the
need of any Fourteenth Amendment "bridge." The case dealt specifically with tax exemptions to churches, yet far from voicing concern
over violation of the Establishment Clause, the United States Supreme
Court actually gave tacit approval to such-exemption practices. 110 Mr.
Justice Douglas fears the granting of tax exemptions to churches as a
long step down the Establishment path."' To this, Chief Justice Burger answers:
If tax exemption can be seen as this first step toward 'establishment' of religion, as Mr.
Justice Douglas fears, the second
112
step has been long in coming.

In spite of the numerous arguments employed by Justice Douglas,
one omission stands out prominently in his dissent. This is the complete absence of any rebuttal to what may be the strongest argument in
the majority opinion-that the alternative result, taxation of churches,
could embroil the state in greater involvement with religion than would
the policy of exemption. Both sides agree in principle that the state
must remain neutral in matters of religion. Mr. Justice Douglas's interpretation of neutrality would deny tax exemptions to churches even
though such exemptions are extended to other nonprofit organizations."' Such an interpretation immediately brings to the fore two
other questions. First, by singling out churches from the general classification of nonprofit, charitable organizations, which are granted exemption, is not the state displaying an attitude of discrimination and
hostility toward religion contrary to the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Everson and Douglas' own Zorach opinion. Secondly, if a
church can be granted tax exemptions for its nonsectarian social welfare functions but not for its purely religious activities, will not the
state become deeply involved in church affairs when attempting to determine the proper ratio between these functions? Will not the state
preserve neutrality more effectively if, as the majority advocates, it
simply leaves churches well enough alone and absolves them from the
whole labyrinth of tax regulations?" 4 In closing, Mr. Justice Douglas declares:
109. 116 U.S. 404.
110. Id. at 408.
111. Walz, supra note 7, at 716.
112. Id. at 678.
113. Id. at 707-08.
114. It might again be noted that the decision in Walz is not that states must
grant tax exemptions to churches, only that they may if they so desire. All fifty states
have so desired.
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[A]s I have read the Constitution and its15philosophy, I gathered
that independence was the price of liberty."
Examination of the problem would seem to indicate that this comment might fit more logically within the majority opinion.
THE IMPACT OF

Walz

Since dividing the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause into separate entities, the Supreme Court has struggled to find
a balance between the two clauses. Speaking for the Court in Everson, Mr. Justice Black referred to neutrality as the proper relationship
of a state toward religious groups and non-believers, but at the same
time he made the Establishment Clause the focal point of the religion
clauses with his "no aid" pronouncement.
The key to the most recent decisions of the Court in this area is the
evolution of the "legislative purpose-primary effect" test. This test
was first established in the Schempp case, where the Court said:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
If either is the adthe primary effect of the enactment?
vancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.116

It must be recalled that the application of the test in Schempp rendered unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause the reading of
the Bible in public schools. The Schempp opinion emphasizes a philosophy of strict neutrality. The rule that the Schempp Court formulated could, by itself, be interpreted liberally, but read in light of the
rest of the opinion, it is very conservative in nature. The Court, in
fact, specifically approved Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson that the First Amendment's purprose,
[W]as to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion. 117
Board of Education v. Allen"" may well have been, up to that time,
115.
116.
117.
118.

Walz, supra note 7, at 716.
Schempp, supra note 40, at 222.
Id. at 217.
Supra note 48.
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the most significant milestone in the series of First Amendment cases
since Everson, for in Allen the Supreme Court changed from a negative to a positive approach toward the church-state relations. The Court
in Allen rested its conclusions on what it considered an application of
the Schempp rule, and superficially the Walz case seems to do the
same. Actually, neither is strictly based on Schempp, nor is Walz
squarely in line with Allen.
What the Court was really faced with in Allen was the application
of the Schempp rule to a situation where the alleged "aid" was financial rather than devotional. The Court was equal to the challenge and
upheld the financial aid by creating a distinction between the religious
and secular functions of a school and finding that the aid only went to
the advancement of those secular functions.
In so doing the Allen Court quoted the Schempp rule but in actuality emphasized the latter aspect of the rule, which stressed the need
for a secular legislative purpose and prirmary effect. The former aspect of the rule, which stressed the concept of neutrality, was only
mentioned in passing in Allen.11 9
The Walz case involved the application of the Schempp-Allen rule
to a situation where the Court could not divide the functions of the
agency aided into religious and secular ones. By its nature the function of a house of worship is religious. Nevertheless the aid was upheld.
The Walz opinion seems to be merely a combination of ideas from
both Schempp and Allen, but in reality it adopts a new approach not
specifically utilized since Everson. The subtlety of Walz is in the application of the Schempp-Allen test. The important difference is that
the Schempp test was originally meant to apply to the Establishment
Clause; Walz, on the other hand, applies it to the religion clause in
general. Much of the problem in interpreting the First Amendment
religion clause has stemmed from the Everson Court's division of the
religion clause into two parts, and what may have been that Court's
overemphasis of the Establishment Clause. By casting new emphasis
on the religion clause as a concept to be considererd in toto, rather than
as two conflicting parts, the Court in Walz may have come around full
circle to the original intentions of the authors of the Amendment, and
may have cleared away much of the confusion caused by the Everson
decision.
119.

178

Id. at 242.
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While, as previously indicated, the Walz opinion could not stress a
secular function which the "aid" related to, it bridged this hurdle by
reverting back to the original neutrality emphasis in Schempp and
making that once again the basis of the test. The purpose of the legislation does not necessarily have to be secular, it need only be neutral.
But even in liberalizing the legislative purpose test, the effect of church
tax exemptions is still an aid to religion. Here the Walz Court retains
the Allen test of involvement in determining whether or not the particular enactment violates the religion clause.
In so doing the Court looked both to the legislative intent and primary effect of the legislation, but instead of emphasizing its secular
nature, the Court emphasized whether it advanced or inhibited religion. Finding a tax exemption to be neutral they concluded that it did
neither, at least past constitutional limits. In this connection both the
historical precedent, and the negative form of a tax exemption were
important in reaching the conclusion that the "aid" was indeed neutral.
While it cannot be denied that a tax exemption constitutes a real benefit to a church, the Court concluded the taxation of a church would be
a possibly greater violation of neutrality.
In revitalizing the emphasis on neutrality in Schempp, however, the
Walz Court does not adopt the Rutledge version that the Schempp
Court approved. Instead, it speaks of a "benevolent" neutrality and
the idea of accommodation. If Allen interpreted Schempp to be in
line with Everson, Walz adjusts Schempp to be more in line with Zorach. The net result is a new criterion more liberal than any since Everson, and one to be applied not just to the Establishment Clause, but
to the religion clause as a whole.
In spite of the Walz Court's attempt to play down the differences between the two parts of the religion clause and to emphasize the complementary aspects of the two, there still remain some areas where the
clauses may conflict. Whereas Everson and the cases immediately following it viewed the Free Exercise Clause as a limiting factor on the
Establishment Clause, the Allen and Walz decisions now indicate that
the converse seems to be true. The Free Exercise Clause has become
the prevailing focal point with the Establishment Clause as its limitation.
In this respect it is noteworthy that Schempp and Allen were both
appealed on the basis of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
but were decided on Establishment grounds only. Walz, on the other
179
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hand, was appealed exclusively on Establishment Clause grounds. The
decision in Walz, as noted, is based on the broader aspect of the religion clause generally, but it is significant that much of the tenor of the
opinion seems to rely upon Free Exercise principles.
We cannot read New York's statute [says the Court] as attempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise
of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on
private profit institutions.120
Finally, the liberalization of standards from a test centering upon the
primary secular purpose to one of simple benevolent neutrality is complemented by the Walz Court's shift in outlook from a "wall" or "line"
concept of separation to a "channel" or "overlapping area" approach.
Far from erecting a barrier, the Court outlines a wide area of tolerant
permissiveness bounded only by the general principles that no religion
be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.
No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very
existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts
-- one which
seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive en12
tanglement. 1
CONCLUSION

Any analysis of the Walz decision must attempt to answer the basic
question of whether Walz is a potential landmark decision, or whether
in future religion clause cases it will be limited to its particular factual
setting. It is submitted that a number of factors indicate the extent of
Walz goes far beyond the narrow boundaries of an isolated case, and
the decision is more likely a precedent-making decision in the area of
the First Amendment religion clause.
The first of these factors relates to the nature of the aid involved.
Everson made clear that normal public welfare benefits may not be
denied an organization merely because it is religiously oriented. A
church is not precluded by the First Amendment from receiving police and fire protection, and this concept also applies to bus services
provided other school children. Allen extended this trend to school
books, which were also provided to all other school children similarly
situated where a clear secular purpose could be shown. Walz on the
other hand approves a tax exemption, a financial aid which is not of
the public welfare nature, although one which is accorded generally to
120.
121.

Walz, supra note 7, at 673.
Id. at 670.
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not-for-profit institutions, even where the secular nature of the aid can
not be established.
This change is accomplished through the second factor which makes
Walz significant, a modification of the Schempp-Allen test. This test
had permitted aid to a religious organization only if the legislative purpose and the primary effect of the aid was secular. Walz substitutes
for the word secular a concept of neutrality-the purpose and primary
effect can neither advance nor inhibit religion. The application of this
change permits aid of a passive nature even where the organization
aided serves no "secular purpose." It must be recognized, however,
that the test so enunciated in Walz encompasses a secular purpose as
one which neither advances nor inhibits religion.
One newspaper commentary immediately following the Walz decision said the case "clearly indicated that any direct money subsidy for
parochial schools would run afoul of the First Amendment."1'22 Such
an interpretation of Walz may have been too conclusive. Although
the Court does say that a direct money subsidy would create "a relationship pregnant with involvement,"1 2 it is speaking within the framework of benefits to churches as such.
A third important factor is that the passive benefit permitted indicates a departure from some of the language used in Everson. The
former "wall of separation" has been replaced by a "channel" which
leaves "room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference." ' 4 In Allen the Court changed from a restrictive to a cautiously permissive approach to state aid to religion, laying
stress on the secular purpose of such aid. Walz retains the permissiveness but no longer retains the necessity of the secular purpose test.
The purpose need only be neutral and the extent of involvement must
not amount to "excessive entanglement."'12 5 The latitude seems broad,
indeed.
Walz, like Everson, considers neutrality as the basic touchstone of
church-state relations, but Walz has significantly modified the standard
to be benevolent neutrality. "The test," says Chief Justice Burger, "is
inescapably one of degree."' 2 6 Walz, it would seem, has extended
122.
123.
124.
125.

Chicago Sun Times, May 5, 1970, at 12, col. 1.
Walz, supra note 7, at 675.
id. at 669.
Id. at 670, 674, 675.

126.
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that degree to a point of permissiveness never reached before in religion clause decisions.
CHARLES J.
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